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Although, the quest to understand emotional processing in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD) has led to an impressive number of studies, the picture that emerges from this research remains 
inconsistent. Some studies find that Typically Developing (TD) individuals outperform those with 
ASD in emotion recognition tasks, others find no such difference. In this paper, we move beyond 
focusing on potential group differences in behaviour to answer what we believe is a more pressing 
question: do individuals with ASD use the same mechanisms to process emotional cues? To this end, 
we rely on model-based analyses of participants’ accuracy during an emotion categorisation task in 
which displays of anger and fear are paired with direct vs. averted gaze. Behavioural data of 20 ASD 
and 20 TD adolescents revealed that the ASD group displayed lower overall performance. Yet, gaze 
direction had a similar impact on emotion categorisation in both groups, i.e. improved accuracy for 
salient combinations (anger-direct, fear-averted). Critically, computational modelling of participants’ 
behaviour reveals that the same mechanism, i.e. increased perceptual sensitivity, underlies the 
contextual impact of gaze in both groups. We discuss the specific experimental conditions that may 
favour emotion processing and the automatic integration of contextual information in ASD.
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are neurodevelopmental conditions characterised by significant deficits in 
social interaction and communication skills, associated with repetitive and restricted interests1. Atypicalities in 
the affective domain are central to ASD and research suggests that individuals with ASD react to social cues 
differently from typically developing (TD) individuals2–4. The roots of such difficulties are still debated but it 
has been suggested that difficulties in processing emotional cues3–5 play an important role in these social defi-
cits. This hypothesis has led to a considerable amount of work that is partly synthesised in a meta-analysis of 48 
studies involving nearly one thousand participants with ASD3. Overall, research points to emotion recognition 
difficulties and to reduced activation of emotion related brain areas in autism6,7. However, a number of studies 
(including ones with large sample sizes and well-matched groups) have found that people with ASD do recognise 
emotions accurately8–10. In this paper, we shift the focus to ask whether the mechanisms behind the processing 
of threat-related emotional expressions (anger/fear) are the same in ASD, irrespective of potential differences in 
accuracy between ASD and TD groups. To do so, we focus on the contextual impact of gaze direction on emotion 
recognition because it is theoretically possible to distinguish different mechanisms that may affect the integration 
of these social cues11.
Emotional displays are often ambiguous and the context in which they are presented also informs emotional 
decoding. For instance, recognition of threat-related emotional expressions is often informed by gaze direction, 
especially in cases where the expression is ambiguous12–17: TD individuals are more likely to judge a neutral face 
as angry when presented with a direct gaze and as fearful when presented with an averted gaze14. TD individu-
als are also quicker and more accurate to recognise anger presented with a direct gaze because it signals to the 
observer that they are under imminent threat, and fear with an averted gaze because it signals a potential threat in 
their surroundings16. These combinations of gaze direction and emotional expressions are thus more salient to the 
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observer11 compared to the reverse combinations (anger with averted and fear with direct gaze). Up until recently, 
the mechanisms through which these phenomena occurred remained unknown. Indeed, classical decision theory 
distinguishes two manners in which gaze direction might influence emotion categorisation: through a change in 
decision bias toward highly salient threat-signalling combinations or through enhanced perceptual sensitivity to 
these combinations. Recent work11 suggests that improved decoding of specific combinations of gaze and emotion 
is associated with a selective enhancement of perceptual sensitivity in TD adults.
In ASD, it is unclear whether the impact of gaze direction on emotion categorisation is intact and whether the 
mechanisms they rely on are the same as those used by neurotypicals. Existing data suggest that highly salient 
threat combinations (anger-direct, fear-averted) are not recognized more quickly than less salient combinations 
in ASD and that they fail to elicit larger face-sensitive event related potentials (ERP) in ASD children18,19. Similar 
results were also found in ASD adults, using fMRI20. Taken together, these findings suggest that individuals with 
ASD may use different mechanisms to combine contextual information, specifically gaze direction, with emo-
tional expressions of anger and fear when categorising emotions. However, a number of issues limit the scope and 
generalizability of these findings. Specifically, in these studies, the emotional expressions used were stereotypical, 
of high intensity, and of long duration. Yet, the automatic impact of gaze direction on emotion perception takes 
place in the brain within 200 ms after stimulus onset, for short stimuli presentation (<300 ms) and, is more prom-
inent when the expression is ambiguous and hence more difficult to discriminate11,21,22. Further, with the excep-
tion of one study20, participants were not explicitly instructed to fixate the eye-region of the face despite evidence 
linking attention directed to the eye-region and emotion recognition performance23. Since ASD individuals do 
not spontaneously orient to the eye region24–26, the lack of explicit instruction may have put the ASD group at a 
disadvantage26–28.
Given the issues reported above, the goal of the present experiment was twofold. First, we aimed to deter-
mine whether participants with ASD use gaze signals to inform emotional decoding of anger and fear under 
well-controlled experimental conditions. To do so, we adapted an emotion categorisation task11 controlling for a 
range of potential confounds: emotion intensity was manipulated parametrically across seven levels of “morphed” 
facial expressions ranging from neutral to intense anger or fear; contextual information was included by pairing 
facial expressions with direct or averted gaze; participants’ attention was drawn to the eyes of the upcoming face 
by presenting a fixation cross right before the appearance of the stimulus; finally, faces were flashed for 250 ms 
in order to tap into the automatic (reflexive rather than reflective) stage of processing22. Our second goal was to 
determine whether, under such experimental conditions, the mechanisms behind threat-related emotion-gaze 
integration are similar in TD and ASD individuals.
Results
The experimental task was a two-choice emotion categorisation task (fear or anger). In each trial participants 
were presented with a facial expression of anger or fear of varying intensity (7 levels of emotion strength), paired 
with direct or averted gaze, and had to categorise the expressed emotion (see Fig. 1). The concomitant gaze direc-
tion was not mentioned to the participants and hence was implicit.
Participants completed 3 blocks of 120 trials. We first ran an ANOVA including blocks as a factor to investigate 
potential effects and interaction with blocks. An effect of blocks (F(2,37) = 3.795, p = 0.032, ηp
2 = 0.170) revealed 
that participants’ emotion accuracy increased over time with significantly better performance in the third block 
(85%) as compared to the first (80%). No other effects or interactions were significant, so block was not included 
as a factor in the remaining analysis. Overall, both groups performed above chance (ASD Median = 82%, 
Z = 3.920, p < 0.001, r = 0.62; TD Median = 88%, Z = 3.920, p < 0.001, r = 0.62) although adolescents with ASD 
reached a significantly lower mean accuracy level (82%) than TD adolescents (86%) (Effect of group: 
F(1,38) = 4.479, p = 0.041, ηp
2 = 0.105).
Increased accuracy with emotion strength in both TD and ASD adolescents. Categorisation per-
formance of both groups increased with emotion intensity (F(6,228) = 53.745, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.706). An emotion 
by intensity interaction (F(6,228) = 12.433, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.247) led to enhanced categorisation performance 
with emotion strength for both anger (Effect of intensity on anger: F(6,228) = 54.952, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.591) and 
fear (Effect of intensity on fear: F(6,228) = 13.267, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.295).
Overall emotion and gaze direction effects. Both groups showed enhanced recognition of fear (ASD: 
86%; TD: 89%) in comparison to anger (ASD: 78%; TD: 84%) (Effect of emotion; F(1,38) = 10.625, p = 0.002, 
ηp
2 = 0.222; no emotion by group interaction: F(1,38) = 0.424, p = 0.519, ηp
2 = 0.011). One possible explanation for 
this fear advantage is related to an enhanced saliency of fear signals, which are perceived as instinctive reactions 
to an overall threatening environment29. This is suggested by a recent paper29 in which the authors compared 
search efficiency for angry and fearful expressions, both being negative emotions signaling danger, embedded in 
a crowd of neutral faces. Contrary to the anger-superiority hypothesis, they found better performance for fearful 
faces, as in the present study. The authors proposed that while anger signals a direct-threat (and therefore an 
unambiguous source of threat), fearful faces signal an indirect and more diffuse threat, and are therefore more 
salient.
The only difference in performance between the two groups was that the TD adolescents performed better 
overall in direct gaze conditions (Z = 3.659, p < 0.001, r = 0.58) compared to averted gaze conditions, while emo-
tion accuracy in the ASD group did not differ between the two (Z = 1.493, p = 0.135, r = 0.24; Gaze * Group 
interaction: F(1,38) = 5.263, p = 0.027, ηp
2 = 0.122). This is consistent with previous research demonstrating an 
overall advantage of TD individuals in direct gaze conditions30–32.
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Increased recognition of threatening conditions in both TD and ASD adolescents. Contrary to 
previous studies in ASD18,19, this study replicates in TD and ASD adolescents previous findings11 in adults of an 
influence of contextual gaze direction on categorisation of threatening emotions (Emotion * Gaze: 
F(1,38) = 26.242, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.408). We observed higher accuracy in the recognition of angry facial expres-
sions when associated with a direct gaze as compared to an averted gaze, and higher accuracy in the recognition 
of fearful faces when associated with an averted gaze as compared to a direct gaze. Importantly, the present exper-
iment reveals that this interaction did not differ between groups (Emotion * Gaze * Group: F(1,38) = 0.287, 
p = 0.595, ηp
2 = 0.007). Indeed, within group analyses revealed that the Emotion by Gaze interaction was signifi-
cant in both the TD (F(1,19) = 16.373, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.463) and the ASD group (F(1,19) = 10.291, p = 0.005, 
ηp
2 = 0.351) with both groups identifying highly salient threat combinations (anger-direct, fear-averted, labelled 
Threat+) better than less salient combinations (anger-averted, fear-direct, labelled Threat−; TD: Z = 2.931, 
p = 0.003, r = 0.46; ASD: Z = 2.696, p = 0.007, r = 0.42; see Fig. 2). Moreover, the variance of accuracy scores in 
Threat+ and Threat− were homogenous across the two groups (Threat+: F(1,38) = 2.313, p = 0.137; Threat−: 
F(1,38) = 0.537, p = 0.468).
Additionally, we computed the Bayes factor to test for the strength of the difference between Threat+ and 
Threat− in ASD as compared to TD33 (see method section). We obtained a Bayes factor higher than 3 (Bayes fac-
tor = 32) when comparing the difference between Threat+ and Threat− in TD and ASD, confirming an increase 
in accuracy for Threat+ conditions in ASD group, similarly to the TD group.
Mechanisms underlying increased recognition of threatening conditions. To assess whether we 
replicate the increased perceptual sensitivity to threatening emotions found in healthy adults11, we compared 
different models that could explain the participants’ behaviour. In the framework of Signal Detection Theory34, 
Figure 1. Stimuli and experimental procedure. (a) Example of facial expressions morphed parametrically 
from neutral to intense fearful/angry expressions providing evidence for one or the other emotion. Each face 
was either paired with a direct or an averted gaze. Threat+ conditions (in orange) correspond to combinations 
of gaze and emotion that signal higher salience and threat for the observer as compared to Threat− conditions 
(in green). (b) For each trial, and following a fixation (1 sec), a face appeared for 250 ms, and participants had a 
4 second response window to indicate whether the face expressed fear or anger.
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an increased performance for Threat+ conditions could either stem from a decision bias toward these conditions 
(model 1), or from an increase in the perceptual sensitivity to these combinations (model 2) (see methods for 
details on the models and model comparisons). Fixed-effect Bayesian model selection (Bayesian information 
criterion) showed that an increased sensitivity to Threat+ conditions explained the data better than a change in 
the decision bias, in both TD and ASD groups (TD: Bayes Factor ≈ 93, ASD: Bayes Factor ≈ 80). The sensitivity 
parameter estimate was significantly enhanced for Threat+ conditions as compared to Threat− in both the TD 
(Fig. 3; p < 0.01, standardized effect size = 2.7, see Methods for details) and the ASD (Fig. 3; p = 0.03, standard-
ized effect size = 1.7, see Method for details) group (see Fig. 3).
Reaction time analyses. Although TD adolescents (M = 350.8, S.E.M. = 5.86) had faster general RTs 
(assessed by the Go/no-Go task) in comparison to the ASD group (M = 380.4, S.E.M. = 9.98; U = 115.000, 
ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.021, r = 0.36), to our surprise, ASD participants were quicker at responding during the 
emotion categorisation task as compared to the TD group (Effect of group: F(1,38) = 13.819, p < 0.001, 
ηp
2 = 0.267). Previous findings on RTs in ASD are mixed: some studies find that these individuals take longer than 
TD individuals to complete emotion categorisation tasks35, others find no difference between the two groups18,36, 
while still others, using several different visual search or detection tasks37,38, report the opposite, finding ASD 
individuals quicker than TD individuals. Yet, it has been generally suggested that in individuals with ASD, better 
Figure 2. Emotion accuracy results for Threat+ and Threat− conditions for the TD group and the ASD 
group. Threat+ combinations were recognised more accurately than Threat− ones in both groups. Note that 
there was a main effect of group with the TD group demonstrating overall higher emotion recognition accuracy 
than the ASD group, but no interaction between group and Threat conditions. Within subject error bars 
represent Mean ± S.E.; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Figure 3. Perceptual sensitivity parameter estimate for Threat+ and Threat− combinations for the TD 
group and the ASD group. Both groups showed enhanced perceptual sensitivity for highly salient emotion-
gaze combinations (Threat+). Error bars represent Mean ± S.E.M.; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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visual search is associated with shorter RTs38. Still, given that ASD showed faster general RTs associated with a 
decreased general performance, a speed-accuracy trade-off effect may be happening. We however believe that our 
main result, i.e. increased performance for Threat+ as compared to Threat− (interaction between gaze and emo-
tion) cannot be explained by such potential speed-accuracy trade-off, as there was no significant interaction 
between gaze and emotion on RTs (F(1,38) = 0.595, p = 0.445, ηp
2 = 0.015; TD F(1,19) = 0.192, p = 0.666, 
ηp
2 = 0.01; ASD F(1,19) = 3.914, p = 0.063, ηp
2 = 0.171). Furthermore, we checked whether there was a correlation 
between general performance and RTs in ASD as a speed-accuracy trade-off proxy: a regression analysis revealed 
that mean RTs is not a significant predictor of ASD participants’ mean performance (F(1,19) = 1.070, p = 0.315).
Gaze direction effects. We conducted RTs analyses to examine whether gaze direction has an influence on 
the speed with which participants decode the two emotions. Firstly, both TD and ASD adolescents’ became 
quicker in responding when the expressed emotions were more intense, as reflected by the intensity by group 
interaction (F(6,228) = 5.364, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.124; F(6,114) = 6.286, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.729; ASD F(6,114) = 6.558, 
p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.338).
Secondly, in both groups, emotions presented with direct gaze were identified quicker than emotions coupled 
with averted gaze (F(1,38) = 7.317, p = 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.161). This could be linked to several previous findings: 1) 
direct as compared to averted gaze is generally easier to detect39; 2) direct gaze leads to quicker RTs regardless of 
it being presented as part of a face or in isolation40 and; 3) both ASD and TD individuals detect quicker targets 
with direct gaze than targets with averted gaze41.
Moreover, there was a Gaze * Group interaction (F(1,38) = 4.171, p = 0.048, ηp
2 = 0.099): ASD participants’ RTs 
were comparable between direct and averted gaze (Z = 0.747, p = 0.455, r = 0.12) while the TD participants’ RTs 
were quicker for direct gaze conditions as compared to averted gaze conditions (Z = 2.501, p = 0.012, r = 0.39), a 
result further confirming the better overall performance of TD individuals when the gaze is directed towards 
them in the present study.
Controlling for baseline RTs difference between group. Finally, in an attempt to control for potential 
baseline reaction time differences, we also ran our analyses while co-varying Go/no-Go RTs out. We found the 
same pattern of results: an effect of group (F(1,37) = 17.986, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.327), no interaction between gaze 
and emotion (F(1,37) = 1.567, p = 0.219, ηp
2  = 0.041; TD F(1,18) = 0.273, p = 0.608, ηp
2  = 0.015; ASD 
F(1,18) = 1.502, p = 0.165, ηp
2 = 0.104). There was an intensity * group interaction (F(6,222) = 5.066, p = 0.003, 
ηp
2 = 0.120; TD F(6,114) = 23.347, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.551; ASD F(6,114) = 10.081, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.347), an effect 
of gaze (F(1,37) = 5.779, p = 0.021, ηp
2 = 0.135), with emotions with direct gaze better identified and this as a 
function of participants’ general reaction times (Gaze * RTs general interaction, F(1,37) = 7.293, p = 0.010, 
ηp
2 = 0.165) and finally, a gaze * group interaction (F(1,37) = 9.426, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.203).
To conclude, following the absence of a significant interaction between emotion and gaze direction on RTs in 
both groups, our results did not replicate the speed advantage for categorising Threat+ as compared to Threat− 
conditions previously demonstrated in TD adolescents18 and neurotypical adults11.
Discussion
The present experiment aimed to determine whether the mechanisms behind emotion-gaze integration are sim-
ilar in TD and ASD individuals, irrespective of potential group differences in accuracy. The results show that 
adolescents with ASD, similarly to TD controls, are more accurate when decoding highly salient combinations of 
gaze and emotion, demonstrating that they combine task-unrelated gaze information with emotion. Importantly, 
although TD participants had higher overall recognition accuracy than ASD participants, the fitting of deci-
sion theoretical models to the behavioural data revealed that, in both TD and ASD adolescents, gaze direction 
enhanced perceptual sensitivity to highly salient combinations, resulting in the associated improved accuracy.
These results stand in sharp contrast with previous observations18–20 showing that contextual gaze direction 
has little impact on emotion categorisation in ASD. However, our experimental set-up differs in several important 
ways. First, the ambiguity of sensory evidence was manipulated using graduated morphs moving from neutral 
to angry or fearful expressions. This is important because the impact of gaze direction is particularly clear in 
ambiguous situations where emotion discriminability is difficult11,42. Second, the contextual cue (gaze direction) 
co-occurred with the decision-relevant stimulus but was irrelevant to the emotion categorization task, and thus 
did not need to be processed explicitly. Third, the facial expressions were presented for a very limited period of 
time, which allowed us to specifically tap into automatic decoding processes22. Finally, participants’ attention was 
drawn to the eye region by displaying a pre-stimulus fixation point at the eye-level of the upcoming face stimulus. 
This feature of the task is particularly decisive for ASD participants who do not preferentially attend to social 
stimuli24,43, such as the eyes24–26, and may be at a disadvantage26–28 in emotion categorisation tasks where attention 
is not expressly drawn to them. Indeed, emotion recognition performance is positively related to attention to the 
eye-region23, notably for negative emotions such as fearful and angry expressions, primarily expressed using the 
upper part of the face44.
Under the specific experimental conditions used in our design, we found that gaze direction has a similar 
impact on performance in emotion categorisation in ASD and TD participants. Although overall performance 
was higher in the TD group, individuals with ASD were able to integrate co-emitted social signals of gaze and 
emotional expression to inform emotion decoding. A key innovation of this study was to reveal the mechanism 
that instantiates the contextual impact of gaze direction on emotion categorisation by fitting theoretical decision 
models to the behavioural data. It is indeed conceivable that participants with ASD reach a higher level of perfor-
mance in the salient gaze-emotion conditions by resorting to underlying processes that are completely different 
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from those used by control participants. Critically, we found that the same mechanism was at play in the ASD 
and in the TD groups and that improved recognition accuracy for highly salient threat-signalling emotion-gaze 
combinations corresponded to a selective enhancement of perceptual sensitivity to these combinations of gaze 
and emotion. Thus, the present findings demonstrate that ASD adolescents are not only able to decode emotions 
but that they also automatically integrate contextual gaze while doing so.
The present study thus extends previous evidence of intact face processing45 and intact prioritisation of salient 
social cues over less salient ones46 in ASD, by demonstrating that adolescents with ASD rely on the same mecha-
nism as TD adolescents to combine contextual social cues (here gaze direction) with facial displays of emotions 
as a function of their salience for the observer. Given that the brief and sudden fixation point at the eye region 
(which triggers attention) was one of the critical differences between the current study and previous studies where 
participants with ASD failed to integrate social cues, it is possible that diminished spontaneous attention to the 
eyes accounts for at least part of the atypicalities in emotion processing commonly reported in ASD. This view is 
also compatible with the idea that diminished automatic orientation to socially relevant signals is a core deficit in 
ASD28 as well as with data demonstrating that the processing of socially relevant signals is intact under motivated 
conditions47. Future work will therefore need to manipulate eye fixation directly in order to confirm whether 
this is indeed a key parameter guiding emotion categorisation in ASD. Since our sample size is relatively small, it 
will also be important to replicate this work and assess its generalizability to various subtypes of ASD. However, 
it is important to note that the effect we report here replicates what has already been described in a sample of 24 
healthy adults11, which suggests that our effect is robust.
To conclude, our results demonstrate not only that adolescents with ASD take into account contextual gaze 
information while processing emotional displays, but more importantly, even though their overall emotion rec-
ognition accuracy is lower than TD adolescents, that the same mechanism, i.e. increased perceptual sensitivity, 
underlies such contextual impact in both groups. These results suggest the possibility that significant difficulties 
in social interaction and communication seen in ASD may exist independently of their ability to process the 
social signals themselves. Future experiments should address whether, when decoding skills appear preserved, 
ASD’s social difficulties are related to dysfunctions in the motivation mechanisms driving attention to socially 
relevant signals or to the mechanisms underlying the preparation of appropriate response behaviour to perceived 
social signals, both crucial to social interactions in daily life.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-four adolescents with ASD aged between 12 and 17 years old and 24 TD adolescents 
participated in this study. Adolescents in the ASD group were recruited from the University Hospital Robert 
Debré (Paris, France). Final diagnosis of ASD was based on DSM IV-TR48 criteria and made by summing the 
information from the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R)49, the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS)50 and data from clinical reports made by experts in the field. ASD participants’ Intelligence 
Quotient (IQ) was assessed using the full Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children version IV51 (WISC IV). 
They were also tested for normal visual acuity using the Freiburg Visual Acuity and Contrast Test52 (FrACT ver-
sion 3.8.2). This test was adapted to the distance of 0.3 meters. Normal vision was ensured by a Snellen fraction 
of 0.3/0.3 (distance of test/distance at which the subject can identify the indicated symbol). Trait anxiety was 
assessed using an abbreviated form53 of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory54 (STAI; See Table 1). Finally, no partic-
ipants were on medication during the period of the study.
Adolescents in the TD group were recruited from a mainstream school. They did not report any history of 
developmental or other psychiatric illness. They all had normal or corrected to normal vision. Due to time con-
straints, IQ in the TD group was assessed with the French Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (four sub-
sets) which has been found to be highly reliable in giving a representative score of the full IQ55 in the general 
population (See Table 1).
The experimental protocol and associated methods were approved by INSERM and licensed by the local 
research ethics committee (ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02628808, Protocol Study ID: 2008-A00019-46). 
Our study was performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All parents and children provided 
written informed consent according to institutional guidelines of the local research ethics committee. All the 
participants were debriefed and thanked following their participation.
Materials and design. The stimuli consisted of 12 face identities (6 female) selected from the original set11 
of 36 identities. Two (1 female) additional identities were used during training only. The original identities were 
drawn from the Radboud Face Database56 and were modified11 using Adobe Photoshop CS5.1 (Adobe Systems, 
San Jose CA) and parametrically morphed11 using FantaMorph (Abrosoft http://www.fantamorph.com/) so 
that, for each identity, 30 stimuli were created; 7 morphs (emotion intensities) * 2 emotions (fear/anger) * 2 gaze 
directions (direct/averted), plus two neutral stimuli, one with direct and one with averted gaze. Hence, our task 
included 360 trials, one third of original number of trials11, divided into 3 blocks in order to avoid tiredness and 
inattention effects.
Emotion Categorisation Task. The experimental task was a two-choice emotion categorisation task (fear 
or anger). The stimuli were projected on a black background using Psychophysics-3 Toolbox57,58 of Matlab (ver-
sion R2014a) software (http://uk.mathworks.com/). In each trial, participants saw a white oval line that remained 
throughout the trial to indicate the size and location of the upcoming stimulus. After 500 ms of the oval’s appear-
ance a fixation point appeared at the level of the stimulus’ eyes for 1000 ms, followed by a target face presented 
for 250 ms. As soon as the face disappeared the participants had a 4000 ms response window to indicate if they 
thought the face expressed anger or fear. To do so, they pressed one of the two control buttons (Ctrl) on the 
keyboard. One button represented fear and the other anger. The side of the button corresponding to fear or 
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anger (e.g., Left Ctrl: anger, Right Ctrl: fear) was consistent across trials for each participant but counterbalanced 
between participants.
Go/no-Go Task. To control for potential overall RT differences between the two groups we measured their 
general reaction times (RTs). We systematically performed all RTs analyses without and with co-varying the 
general RTs out, and found that the results remain the same. Participants took part in a Go/no-Go task, created 
on E-prime stimulus presentation software (http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm). They saw a white fixation cross 
on a grey background, in the centre of the screen, followed 67% of the time by a black dot. When the black dot 
appeared participants had to press the SPACE button as fast as possible.
Procedure. Participants were seated at 30 cm distance from the laptop. During the Emotion categorisation 
task, they were told that they would see faces at the centre of the screen and had to indicate whether they thought 
that the face expressed anger or fear by pressing the corresponding button. Initially, they completed 10 trials of 
the emotion categorisation task (training), in order to familiarise with the task. In order to avoid boredom and 
tiredness effects, the main task was divided in 3 blocks of 120 trials each. At the end of each block, participants 
could see their percentage of accuracy and speed of responding. Participants completed the first block of the task. 
Subsequently they did the Go/no-Go test and a second block of the main task. Following that, the participants 
gave their answers to the Anxiety scale verbally to the experimenter before they completed the third and final 
block of the emotion categorisation task. Finally, their visual acuity was tested.
Data Analysis. Four ASD and one TD participants were excluded because they were at chance level during 
the task (accuracy 40–60%) resulting in 20 ASD participants. These 20 ASD participants were then automati-
cally matched, using R Project for Statistical Computing (www.rproject.org) with 20 TD participants (among 
23) according to chronological age, gender and IQ (see Table 1). The matched 20 TD and 20 ASD participants 
had the same levels of anxiety, which is the most prevalent disorder comorbid with ASD59 and has been found to 
increase one’s sensitivity to social threat60 (see Table 1). ADOS scores of the ASD group which were not measured 
with module 4 (n = 1) were calibrated61 and descriptive values can be found in Table 1. Analyses were performed 
only on valid (response) trials. All non-response trials and all trials with RTs less than 200 ms were excluded from 
the analysis. Lastly, we compared the total number of non-response trials between the two groups and found no 
significant differences (see Table 1).
Model-free analyses on performance. Mean emotion accuracy, as well as the standard error of the mean 
(S.E.M) for each group are listed in Table 2. RTs descriptive values and results can be found Table 3. Data was 
analysed using Matlab software and SPSS-18. All p-values reported are two-tailed. Partial eta squared (ηp
2) is 
reported as the effect size of the F statistics, r of the non-parametric comparisons and phi (φ) for the chi squared 
test on gender. A value of ηp
2 = 0.01/r = 0.1/φ = 0.1 represents a small effect size, ηp
2 = 0.06/r = 0.3/φ = 0.3 a 
medium one and over ηp
2 = 0.14/r = 0.5/φ = 0.5 a large effect size62.
We first performed a 2 × 2 × 7 repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy with Emotion (anger vs. fear), Gaze 
(direct vs. averted) and Intensity (7 levels) as within subjects’ factors and Group (ASD vs. TD) as a between subject 
factor. The same analysis was performed within each group independently. As the distribution of the TD group’s 
residuals was not normal, post-hoc analyses are done using non-parametric statistical tests. In order to compare 
the performance of each group in highly salient emotion-gaze combinations (Threat+) as compared to less sali-
ent emotion-gaze combinations (Threat−), we calculated the mean for each of these two types of combinations.
Further, we calculated the difference between these two means and used it to compute the Bayes factor63 for 
the difference between these two conditions in the ASD group. A Bayes factor uses prior knowledge in associ-
ation with newly acquired data to describe the likelihood (llh) of the current data in supporting an alternative 
ASD (n = 20) TD (n = 20) Test value, p value, effect size value
Age 14.10 (0.43) 13.75 (0.33) U = 178.000, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.543, r = 0.09
Gender Males n = 16 Males n = 15 Χ2(1) = 0.143, p = 0.705, φ = 0.06.
IQ total 103.2 (4.3) 100.1 (2.1) U = 184.500, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.664, r = 0.07
IQ verbal 102.9 (5.6) 100.4 (2.2) U = 189.500, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.776, r = 0.04
IQ performance 104.8 (4.5) 99.65 (2.8) U = 175.500, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.507, r = 0.10
Anxiety 14.6 (0.9) 13.5 (0.7) U = 162.000, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.302, r = 0.16
Total non-response trials 32 (0.34) 54 (0.43) U = 150.500, ASD = TD = 20, p = 0.164, r = 0.22
ADOS 11.4 (0.45) NA NA
Table 1.  Mean (S.E.M.) of chronological age, gender, total IQ, verbal IQ, performance IQ and trait anxiety 
for both groups (after automatic matching procedure), total missed trials of each group and ADOS for the 
ASD group.
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hypothesis (H1) against a null (H0) and is given by the formula B =  llhH1/llhH0. If the Bayes factor is above 3 then 
the data provides support for the H1 while if it is less than 1/3 it provides support for the H0. We wanted to test 
the H1 that there is a significant difference between Threat+ and Threat− in the ASD group against an H0 that 
finds no difference between the conditions and for this purpose we used the TD group’s mean difference as the 
prior.
Model selection. We used model based analyses to characterise the mechanisms underlying the enhanced 
performance of the groups in the Threat+ combinations, compared to the Threat− combinations, in the frame-
work of Signal Detection Theory (SDT)34. Participants’ behaviour was accounted for using a simple psychometric 
model:
Φ= +⁎p anger w x b( ) ( ) (1)
where p(anger) is the probability of selecting the emotion of anger, φ is the cumulative normal function and x is 
the evidence for the corresponding emotion (emotion intensity; from −7 corresponding to intense fear, to +7 
corresponding to intense anger, through 0 which represents a neutral expression), w to the perceptual sensitivity 
to the emotional expression (multiplicative by the sensory evidence), and b to an additive stimulus-independent 
bias toward ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ responses.
We compared two models that could account for the influence of gaze on emotion categorization: model 1, 
where gaze direction would bias responses towards Threat+ combinations and model 2, where gaze direction 
would enhance perceptual sensitivity to Threat+ combinations.
A change in the decision bias implies that the bias toward anger or fear is different for direct and averted gaze 
conditions such as:
Φ= +⁎p A dir w x b( ) ( ) (2)dir
Φ= +⁎p A avt w x b( ) ( ) (3)avt
where the probability of selecting the emotion of anger is p(A|dir) in the direct gaze condition and p(A|avt) in the 
averted gaze condition, w is the perceptual sensitivity to the emotional expression (common to all conditions if 
the effect is on the bias), bdir is a bias toward ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ responses in the direct gaze condition, that is different 
from bavt, the bias toward ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ responses in the averted gaze condition.
A change on the sensitivity implies that the sensitivity is shared for THREAT+ conditions (Anger direct and 
fear averted) and different from the sensitivity to THREAT− conditions (Anger averted and fear direct) such as:
Φ+ = ++⁎p A Th w x b( ) ( ) (4)th
Φ− = +−⁎p A Th w x b( ) ( ) (5)th
where the probability of selecting the emotion of anger is p(A|Th+) in Threat+ condition and p(A|Th−) in 
Threat− condition, wth+ is the perceptual sensitivity to the emotional expression in Threat+ conditions, wth− is 
the perceptual sensitivity to the emotional expression in Threat− conditions, and b is a bias toward ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ 
responses (common to all conditions if the effect is on the sensitivity).
We used Bayesian model selection and calculated the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to determine 
which of the two models was more likely to explain the observed data. To check whether TD and ASD par-
ticipants showed differences in the underlying model best fitting their behaviour (increased performance for 
Threat+ conditions, which could be due either to changes in sensitivity or decision bias), we applied fixed-effects 
model comparisons. These comparisons assume that all participants within one group used the same underlying 
model to generate their behaviour. To compare the two models within each group, we computed the Bayes fac-
tor64 of the different models as the ratio of each model’s evidence to the compared model’s evidence. To compare 
sensitivity parameter estimates across Threat+ and Threat− conditions within each group, we computed the 








ASD Accuracy (%) 76 (2) 79 (2) 86 (3) 85 (2) 82 (2)
TD Accuracy (%) 80 (2) 87 (2) 88 (8) 90 (7) 86 (6)





Direct Fear-Averted Fear-Direct Overall
ASD RTs (ms) 866 (38) 841 (36) 855 (40) 869 (38) 858 (37)
TD RTs (ms) 1046 (37) 1021 (33) 1073 (35) 1036 (39) 1044 (34)
Table 3.  Mean (S.E.M.) of RTs per group per condition.
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and computed the empirical probability that the sensitivity parameter in the Threat+ condition is higher than 
the sensitivity parameter in the Threat− condition (by computing the posterior pdf of the difference in sensitivity 
parameter between the two conditions, and taking the area under the curve above zero). Importantly, this statistic 
is independent of the shape of the distribution, but given the approximate Gaussian shape of the difference in 
sensitivity parameter between conditions, we report standardized effect sizes within each group corresponding 
to the ratio between the best-fitting mean of the difference divided by the best-fitting standard deviation of the 
difference (in a least-squares sense).
Analyses on reaction times. We finally conducted a 2 × 2 × 7 repeated measures ANOVA on reaction 
times (RTs) with Emotion (anger vs fear), Gaze (direct vs averted) and Intensity (7 levels) as within subjects’ fac-
tors and, Group (ASD vs. TD) as a between subject factor (for descriptive values see Table 3).
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